Struggling with a Phantom: The “Myth of the War” in Russia’s Domestic and Foreign Policies / Russian Historical Politics in November 2011. An analytical Report
There is no need today to prove how important of an image of the “other” can be when pursuing common interests within a community. Rallying “against” someone (for example, the supposed champions of fascism and “falsifiers of history”), or opposing the revision of “glorious” pages in “our” history on the basis of archival data appear as leitmotifs of Russia’s official “historical” politics. Numerous initiatives by different agencies in November 2011 demonstrated the diverse range of approaches deployed by State institutions to deal with these issues.
November was, for many, a month of great expectations – the pre-election battle was at its height and the fire of political passions reached a heretofore unprecedented level. A video flying around the Internet showed spectators booing Vladimir Putin when he appeared at a fighting match between Fyodor Emelianenko and Jeff Monson, and officials’ repeated attempts to explain away the embarrassing situation convinced scarcely anyone – everyone was waiting for a miracle. A miracle did not take place in the Russian space industry – the space probe Phobos-Grunt’s fall to Earth only a short time after reaching orbit placed yet another black mark on the reputation of Roskosmos and all government policies of support for the innovative spheres of industry. Elections in South Ossetia delivered an unanticipated outcome, in the USA actions were being taken to disband the Occupy Wall Street movement, and news came from London about high-profile revelations regarding the activities of and relationships within the Russian political and economic elite of the 1990s.
Against this background, unexpected shifts took place in the government’s historical politics. Nikita Lomakin, editor of the Monitoring Historical Politics project, discusses the interpretation of these goings on and their relationship to other states.
Struggling with the Phantom: The “Myth of the War” in Russia’s Domestic and Foreign Policies
One of the primary goals of historical politics is the formation and preservation of the identities of the government and specific social groups. Today it is no longer necessary to substantiate the old thesis about the importance of an image of the “other” to the realization of common interests within a community. Rallying “against” someone (for example, apparent champions of fascism and “falsifiers of history”) or opposing the revision of “glorious” pages in “our” history on the basis of archival data appear as leitmotifs Russia’s official “historical” politics. In November 2011, numerous initiatives by different agencies demonstrated the diverse range of approaches employed by the state institutions to deal with these issues.
Outside
The “outrage” of Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is currently one of the primary modes used to construct Russia’s image in the political field inhabited by Russia and neighboring countries. Notes expressing this “outrage” are sent to the governments of countries inside the post-Soviet sphere. As a pretext, these notes employ apparent or entirely real attacks on the “myth of the war” that has been cultivated in Russia in recent decades. The “myth of the war” proposes to construct an image of the infallible Soviet soldier-liberator, denies the notion that the Baltic States and Poland were annexed by force in 1939-1941, and suppresses the history of violence perpetrated by the Red Army in Eastern Europe.
This “outrage,” however, requires a distinct formulation of its own concepts. One step in this direction, by all appearances, was the November 17 publication on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ website of a “fact sheet” titled, “The Foreign Policy Activities of the USSR on the Eve of the Great Patriotic War” (see: urokiistorii.ru/3274). Devoid of any references to sources and even of remote hints about discussions of the questions touched upon in the “fact sheet,” the document gives one the impression that it represents internal instructions for MFA officials regarding basic provisions for the “myth of the war.”
This approach to the history of relations between the USSR and the countries of northern, eastern, and southeastern Europe is used to justify the MFA’s intensely reverent attitude toward monuments to soldier-liberators. Diplomats perceive the monuments’ movement or dismantling as the symbolic destruction of Russia, the legal heir to the USSR. It is no coincidence that government-run media outlets accompanied their reports about the relocation of Warsaw’s Brotherhood in Arms memorial with numerous qualifications about the MFA’s agreement with the event (see: urokiistorii.ru/2551). At the end of the month, the defacing of a monument to Soviet soldiers in Budapest resonated loudly in the Russian press and was momentarily raised to the level of inter-governmental relations (see: urokiistorii.ru/2640). The official reason for the address to the Hungarian government was an agreement signed by both countries regarding the commemoration of fallen soldiers and the civilian victims of war.
The peculiar identification of “anti-Soviet” with “anti-Russian” and, therefore, “fascist/Nazi” emerged as a subject of discussion at the UN in November (see: urokiistorii.ru/2618). On November 17 (the day the MFA published the aforementioned “fact sheet”) at the meeting of the Third Committee during the 66th session of the UN General Assembly, a majority voted to adopt a resolution initiated by Russia, which condemned “modern forms of racism, race discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance.” Thirty-six countries are listed among the document’s authors. For the most part, these are small island nations and states in Latin America and Africa. Six country-members of the CIS were also listed: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
In a Russian-language press release, the MFA singled out the rendering of fascism, the “glorification of the movement and the former members of the Waffen-SS organization,” in new memorials and demonstrations as a modern form of racism. The rehabilitation of the enemies of Soviet power in the “liberated” countries and their identification with the “national-liberation” movement, according to the resolution, should also be condemned. The MFA also lamented the large number of countries voting against the resolution or abstaining from the vote (the results of the vote in the Third Committee are available on the UN’s website). Among their number were not only the countries whose politics the resolution primarily targeted (including the majority of the remaining CIS members: Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine), but also the USSR’s former wartime allies: the USA, the UK, and France. According to the MFA, the fact that most of the votes against the resolution came from European countries points to “revanchist tendencies silencing the lessons of the Second World War.”
Attempts at legitimizing Russia as the protector of the “lessons of the war” in the post-Soviet sphere feed into active efforts to limit historians’ access to archives. Archival evidence would likely have discredited not only law enforcement agencies, as the “myth of the war” functions to defend their reputation and authority, but also the very moral authority of Russia as heir of the USSR. In November, the mass media made public an unpublished agreement regulating the work of archives signed at an October summit of the CIS in St. Petersburg (see: urokiistorii.ru/2572). The press leaked a few details of the new document: all participants in the pact should now agree upon a decision about the opening of archival collections, which had previously been accepted independently by some members of the Commonwealth. Officials declined to comment. Regardless of calls to “make noise” about this initiative, the agreement about archives remained the subject of discussion within only a very narrow circle of historians and human rights activists.
In the field of “memorial politics,” Russia’s foreign policy activities are not, however, limited to safeguarding the “myth of the war” from possible encroachments. A new sore spot for the Russian government’s historical politics became apparent when unknown individuals attacked a memorial plague dedicated to Pyotr Stolypin in Kiev (see: urokiistorii.ru/2607). In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ description, which expressed outrage at this event, the vandals’ actions acquired a truly poetic character:
“The bas-relief suffered seriously. The vandals struck it with such blows that they left traces like saber wounds.”
Symbolizing the need for a “firm hand” to transform and shape a “strong Russia,” the figure of Stolypin became almost one of the most important “sites of memory” for the current government as of 2011 (on propaganda, see: Monitoring of Historical Policy: April–October 2011). As a site of commemoration, moreover, his figure references the conservative program of the ruling party. In this regard, a foreign attack on the prime minister’s memory offers a new opportunity to promote ideas expressed by the authorities.
The official picture of “celebrations and outrages” has tended to overshadow news about the appearance of joint commissions for the discussion of controversial issues in the history of international relations. The first meeting of a Russian-Latvian commission of historians thus went virtually unnoticed (see: urokiistorii.ru/2588). Also, a Russian-Polish commission has been left without substantial support from the Russian side. This commission’s joint project, titled “White Spots, Black Spots,” has been displayed in the libraries in most of Poland’s schools and institutes of higher education, but up to now remains nearly impossible to find in Russia (see: urokiistorii.ru/2650). Meanwhile, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ “outrage” gave rise on several occasions to major media events during the month of November. Crafted more for Russian citizens than those allegedly causing it, this “outrage,” this sparked discussions and made possible the formation of an image of a “strong Russia” within Russia itself, an image that the highest government authorities and the Church turn to frequently and with pleasure. In this sense, foreign “memorial” politics become domestic.
Inside
Inside the country, November offered several dates on which the authorities could cultivate the “myth of the war.” Each occasion was expertly used for the creation of visible, news-making events.
The main Second World War event “experienced” in Russia in November was the Battle of Moscow. The authorities paid special attention to the 70th anniversary of the parade that took place on November 7, 1941 [on this date, Red Army troops marched in a traditional parade through Red Square on their way to the front, in an effort aimed at boosting the morale of both soldiers and civilians – trans.]. Historical reenactments and an address to veterans by Dmitry Medvedev marked this date (see: urokiistorii.ru/2550). In the course of a meeting that day with individuals who participated in the war, the president also reminded his audience of the restoration of war memorials throughout the country, an effort to which the government should commit no less than 2.5 million rubles (see: urokiistorii.ru/2553). The Moscow mayor’s office reported on the large number of public events being held and on generous gifts to veterans (see: urokiistorii.ru/2552). Moscow’s Department of Education organized a competition for teachers in honor of the anniversary (see: urokiistorii.ru/2655). In addition to this, in Volgograd festivities marked another anniversary celebration (the second in one year) dedicated to the events of the Battle of Stalingrad (see: urokiistorii.ru/2580).
As usual, conservative circles reacted most keenly to the government’s policy of glorifying the histories of the war and victory, of creating a “black and white” image of the war. The Battle of Moscow thus became a proving ground for developing a new conception of the history of the Orthodox Church. One key event was the presentation of Nikolai Blokhin’s book Border (Rubezh), published by the academic Institute for Economic Strategies. The novel, which assumes a documentary style, offers an alternative history of the war, wherein the central role is played by the Church and orthodox saints (see: urokiistorii.ru/2574). The Regnum agency has sounded the distinctive echo of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ battle against “falsifiers of history” and advocates of racism overseas. Regnum’s initiative evidences conservative views, proposing to establish a day of memory for the victims of fascism and collaborationism, which would be supported by veteran organizations (see: urokiistorii.ru/2565).
The integrating potential of the myth of the war made itself known in Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov’s proposal to have his republic’s capital named a City of Military Glory (see: urokiistorii.ru/2566). This is one of the republic leader’s undertakings aimed at returning the “battle” to the Chechen people’s past during the war. Previously, Nurdi Nukhazhiyev, Chechnya’s human rights commissioner, threatened to take action against the authors of a twentieth-century Russian history textbook, Moscow State University professors Aleksandr Vdovin and Aleksandr Barsenkov, for leveling at Chechens supposedly slanderous accusations of collaborationism and desertion (see: urokiistorii.ru/current/news/2010/10/uchebnik-skandal).
Efforts aimed at seeking out and developing “alternative histories” of the country continued in November against the backdrop of increasingly intense promotions of the myths of war and victory on the part of interested institutions of power. A number of public initiatives were thus dedicated to the “history of the non-victors” (see: urokiistorii.ru/51414). These efforts received a powerful impetus from the calendar, as October 30 is the day of memory for the victims of political repression. Several events testified to the existence of local memories of “non-victors”: the story of an exhibition of drawings in Sterlitamak (see: urokiistorii.ru/2560), news of a conference dedicated to victims of repression in the Komi Republic (see: urokiistorii.ru/2563), and the creation of the Kolyma Cross medal, which honors camp survivors, by a group that searches out former Kolyma inmates (see: urokiistorii.ru/2600). A desire to take a different (in comparison to the official picture) view of the war’s history formed the basis for the organization of the Perm-36 museum center (see: urokiistorii.ru/memory/place/perm-36), and regular readings of Astafyev, which are dedicated to “truth and fiction” about the war (see: urokiistorii.ru/2623). Attempts on the part of members of the public to involve themselves in questions surrounding the creation of memorial plaques resonated in the press.
News Index for November 2011
The Budget for Historical Politics:
urokiistorii.ru/2548; urokiistorii.ru/2553; urokiistorii.ru/2564; urokiistorii.ru/2581; urokiistorii.ru/2579; urokiistorii.ru/2595; urokiistorii.ru/2604.
Historical Parallels in Politics:
urokiistorii.ru/2568; urokiistorii.ru/2569; urokiistorii.ru/2591; urokiistorii.ru/2630; urokiistorii.ru/2629.
Public Discussions, Authorities’ Reactions:
urokiistorii.ru/2537; urokiistorii.ru/2544; urokiistorii.ru/2560; http://urokiistorii.ru/2575; urokiistorii.ru/2573; urokiistorii.ru/2585; urokiistorii.ru/2592; urokiistorii.ru/2600; urokiistorii.ru/2594; urokiistorii.ru/2644; urokiistorii.ru/2658.
The Soviet Nomenklatura in Memorial and Commemorative Events:
urokiistorii.ru/2540; urokiistorii.ru/2570.
Schools, Museums, and Educational Work:
urokiistorii.ru/2538; urokiistorii.ru/2541; urokiistorii.ru/2543; urokiistorii.ru/2559; urokiistorii.ru/2550; urokiistorii.ru/2557; urokiistorii.ru/2580; urokiistorii.ru/2597; urokiistorii.ru/2606; urokiistorii.ru/2657; urokiistorii.ru/2655; urokiistorii.ru/2646.
Translated by Adrianne Jacobs
