Monitoring the Politics of History: April–October 2011 (Six-Month Analysis and Report)
Introduction
A society’s understanding of its past and various versions of that past not only fuel historians' and sociologists' discussions, but also ignite heated socio-political debates. A powerful political tool can be found in the handling of a given image of the past and the use of historical resources for concrete goals and in specific contexts. Representatives of state power, various political parties and groups, public organizations, and even private individuals all have access to these resources. In October 2010, International Memorial began a monitoring project that addresses such historical politics in contemporary Russia
In this first half-yearly report on the materials of the project’s work, we will discuss the news of April-September 2011. We must admit that now, looking back at the events of the past year from the perspective of spring 2012, we are beginning our analysis of the monitoring materials from a somewhat controversial and ambiguous position: speaking of the spring, summer and early fall of last year we obviously will keep in mind the December events, which followed the State Duma elections, as well as the new protests of 2012. All of this went a long way in breaking down notions of like-mindedness and general, mass support for government policy.
We previously addressed hypotheses on the development of the general principles by which historical politics function in Russia in the introduction to a piece comparing the views on history espoused by United Russia and the CPRF
This project conceives of historical politics broadly as a complex of actions (declarations, initiatives) in the sphere of the development and promotion of historical data and their interpretations throughout social space. The criterion for participation in historical politics is an ability to introduce one’s interpretation into a public space using various forms and instruments, such as monuments, museums, encyclopedias, etc.
In terms of the subject of the politics of history in Russia, we consider not only politicians and major parties, not only important state and social institutions, but also ordinary people, who, as individuals or along with like-minded others, form non-state organizations, which are capable of adjusting the big picture. The idea of monitoring emerges from the belief that society's private, sometimes scarcely noticeable reactions to historical politics, as regulated by the authorities, can be significant for understanding the situation in contemporary Russia. The mass media possesses the ability to produce and reproduce meanings, thus serving not only in its direct capacity as a channel for information, but also aiming to shape perception, to consolidate certain views and images of the past
The final picture is, no doubt, controversial and incomplete – within it we see currents and tendencies of various degrees of historical, social, and political importance. Yet events such as the recent protests that spilled over from the Internet into the streets (the rallies on Bolotnaya Square, Sakharov Avenue and Yakimanka public rallies; the “White Ring” demonstrations, May’s “folk celebrations,” “Occupy Abay,” etc.) have shown that an appeal to the dominant position of the state authorities, the “opinion of majority” prop, cannot always serve as a reliable indicator of public moods.
Institutional Historical Politics: The State, Political Parties, and the Church
The official perspective on history (historian Marc Ferro classifies this as “institutional history”
During the monitoring period, the largest number of relevant news items dealt with the reactions of various groups and public institutions to significant dates in twentieth-century history, including those of the Great Patriotic War (World War II – trans.), Stalinist and post-Stalinist state repressions, and the breakup of the Soviet Union. As a rule, in 2011, historical politics were driven by associations with commemorative dates, such as the fiftieth anniversary of Gagarin’s space mission, the bicentennial of the War of 1812, 1150th anniversary of the founding of the Russian state, Pyotr Stolypin’s 150th birthday, and the 25th anniversary of the Chernobyl accident (as well as a great variety of other more local anniversaries: 425 years since the founding of Voronezh (http://historypolitics.livejournal.com/86820.html), Sergei Radonezhskiy 700th birthday (http://urokiistorii.ru/1599), etc.). All these events, each appearing for a time as the focus of public discussions thanks to their commemoration, are actively discussed, redefined, interpreted by the authorities in their own way, in order to preserve the state’s monopoly on their “correct” interpretation.
In May and June 2011, the President and Prime Minister both emphasized the “fundamental” questions of history, as when Vladimir Putin, speaking about June 22 (the anniversary of the 1941 invasion of the USSR by Axis forces – trans.), described the falsification of the history of the Great Patriotic War as an infringement on “the principles of the world order.
Victory in the Great Patriotic War represents the central event in the history of the Russian state. First, according to the authorities’ logic, school education should be responsible for “correct” knowledge and understanding of historical issues, hence Minister of Culture Vladimir Medinskiy’s oft-repeated thesis about the necessity of unifying history textbooks. According to Medinskiy, who is also a member of both United Russia and the Commission Against the Falsification of History, there should ideally be only a single textbook for each age group, and that book should offer a clearly outlined and consistent version of history (“there is no need to promote pluralism in the brain of a fifth-grader,” see: http://urokiistorii.ru/2405). Sergei Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, who has spoken about the need to combat the “historical sclerosis” that is spreading across the world (http://urokiistorii.ru/2476), is also concerned to provide “protection” for “our historical memory” – which may be expressed, inter alia, in general approaches to joint history textbooks (consultations are taking place regarding writing joint Russian-Ukrainian and Russian-Latvian handbooks). Further, ideas about unifying and controlling knowledge impact the release of historical films, and also underpin discussions about “improving” the unified state examination (http://urokiistorii.ru/2491).
Official stances on history find complements in other modes of “working with the past”: political meetings and special demonstrations honoring memorial dates (such as the “rally-requiem,” the “soldiers’ breakfast,” and free bus tours: http://urokiistorii.ru/2052, http://urokiistorii.ru/2055), and the planned installation and re-installation of war monuments, memorial plaques and steles (primarily relating to the theme of the Great Patriotic War: http://urokiistorii.ru/2935).
Parliamentary parties, which formed a “systemic opposition” to United Russia in the State Duma in April-October 2011, generally draw upon an understanding of the goals of history similar to that of the ruling party, although differences do exist.
The CPRF thus highlights the figure of Stalin and an apologia for Stalinism. While communists do not neglect Lenin, Russia’s various regions tend to exhibit a range of reactions to Lenin’s name (http://urokiistorii.ru/2833). Monuments to Lenin are destroyed and dishonored in some areas, elsewhere old monuments are restored and new ones built, and meanwhile public discussion about the appropriateness of removing the “leader’s” corpse from the Lenin Mausoleum on Red Square intensifies.
When one analyzes the CPRF’s rhetoric it becomes obvious that the appeal to Stalin’s image not only addresses the past and works to defend the projects of the CPSU and the USSR, but also contains polemical and critical elements targeting the current administration. An interested observer thus readily grasps the reference to the activities of present-day state functionaries when the CPRF decorates party banners in Samara and Togliatti with images of Stalin and the phrase, “Corruption? No, I’ve never heard of it,” (http://urokiistorii.ru/2020).
In Moscow, CPRF posters attempted to cast Gennady Zyuganov in a particular light by placing an image of Stalin over the party leader’s shoulder (http://urokiistorii.ru/2145). Yet these billboards quickly sparked a controversy and were removed (http://urokiistorii.ru/2145) on a convenient pretext. It is likely that those who made decision to remove the posters saw them not only as promotion of Zyuganov, but also as criticism of the authorities.
Finally, the “Stalin Buses” also serve as a Stalin-related tool in the hands of the CPRF. Word of the buses’ appearance on the streets of major cities can be heard on the eve of each major Soviet military holiday. The organizers, who collect donations online, present their actions as “non-political” and continually attempt to place advertisements featuring Stalin on the sides of commercial minibuses. These efforts failed in Moscow, as the advertising agency decided that Stalin’s image makes the advertisements political. We do not know whether the advertising agency made this decision independently or in response to urging “from above” (http://urokiistorii.ru/1631). Stalin’s image has, however, appeared on public transit in several major cities (as, for example, in Omsk: http://urokiistorii.ru/1618).
At the same time Stalin and the crimes of the Stalin era – especially the mass repressions of the 1930s-1950s – serve as the target of criticism from state representatives, especially on key dates (such as the Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Political Repression, October 30, http://urokiistorii.ru/2522), or in the in connection with events relevant to international relations (such as the Katyn massacre, http://historypolitics.livejournal.com/16362.html). Local authorities’ criticism of the Soviet-era state terror apparatus can be heard during reburial ceremonies for the repressed, upon the installation of monuments to the victims of terror, and on other similar occasions (http://www.urokiistorii.ru/2518,http://urokiistorii.ru/2322).
An endorsement of Stalinism still lurks within the authorities’ political uses of history, appearing in the form of a grand omission. While it is inappropriate to praise Stalin in connection with the Soviet victory in WWII or the “achievements” of the Soviet economy (collectivization, industrialization), it remains both possible and necessary to take pride in these successes. United Russia and the CPRF promote images of the Great Patriotic War that resemble one another in the way that the memory of the war is overshadowed by the Great Victory discourse
We will briefly consider other Duma parties, which fall back upon patriotic rhetoric when discussing the Great Patriotic War. Reproducing United Russia’s programs almost word for word, A Just Russia activists visit veterans, often in connection with simultaneous PR-campaigns, group photographs, and so on. A Just Russia sometimes experiments with form, as when they organized a “motor rally” through places significant to WWII veterans (http://historypolitics.livejournal.com/13435.html). And yet at times it seems that A Just Russia copies the communists, pointing to bureaucratism and state official’s negligence, all in an effort to demonstrate support for relevant groups of voters (retirees, veterans). If the CPRF monitors cases of non-payment of pensions and failures to allocate apartments to veterans (these cases arise quite frequently, but the communists play with only the most well-known instances), A Just Russia pays particular attention to the “children of war,” demanding that these individuals be considered “full-fledged” veterans of the Great Patriotic War, and that they be granted the relevant benefits, pensions and memorial medals (http://urokiistorii.ru/2111) (the CPRF is also involved in these activities in some regions).
In both cases these programs by the “systemic opposition” run into economic problems in specific regions, where local budgets, for either internal or external reasons, cannot support such initiatives. Representatives of the CPRF and A Just Russia attack the government from this position, acting like champions of social justice. (You can follow the battle between the CPRF and A Just Russia over which group is “further left” or “truly left” in these examples: http://urokiistorii.ru/2332, http://historypolitics.livejournal.com/40232.html).
The programs of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), articulated first and foremost by its leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky, differ in that they place less emphasis on historical experience. World War II, Stalin, and repression scarcely appear in the rhetoric of the LDPR leader, who has long asserted that his party is strictly anti-communist. When LDPR members do address history, their statements are often superficial, sometimes even absurd. In the party pamphlet, Tougher Look, Russians!, Vladimir Zhrinovsky aims to convince readers that Russia (the USSR, the Russian Empire) has never conducted wars of conquest, that “Russians,” the “heart of the Empire,” always related peaceably to other peoples within the empire and have frequently become victims of the treachery perpetrated by satellite states (http://www.urokiistorii.ru/2471). Alongside Zhirinovsky’s statements, even United Russia’s stance appears objective and well balanced.
These parties’ positions have become evident in their attitude toward the Presidential Human Rights Council’s proposal, “On Commemoration of Memory of Victims of Totalitarian Regime and on National Reconciliation.”
The program (or what is understood as the program, as representatives of the CPRF and United Russia often conduct debates with an imaginary opponent, whose appearance they can transform at will) is criticized for potentially blurring distinctions between the “totalitarianisms” of Stalin’s USSR and Hitler’s Germany, stripping Russia of its moral right to take pride in the victory in World War II, creating a major rift in society, infringing on the rights and freedoms of contemporary party leaders and their allies through criticism of Stalin’s ideology and those responsible for repression, etc. Finally, United Russia and the CPRF have also alleged that, under current conditions, the authors of the program are simply trying to divert society’s attention away from real and pressing problems.
Probably the most important event in historical politics in 2011 (aside from the annual pomp surrounding May 9, Victory Day) was a series of celebrations held in spring 2011 in honor of the fiftieth anniversary of Yuri Gagarin’s space mission. Gagarin’s landing site in the Saratov Region was named a cultural heritage site (http://urokiistorii.ru/1672), Gagarin’s bust appeared alongside the busts of other important historical figures in the “Alley of Russian Glory” (http://www.urokiistorii.ru/1657), DVDs with educational materials were issued (http://urokiistorii.ru/1775), competitions for children’s drawings were organized according to Soviet tradition (http://urokiistorii.ru/1702), while other events included readings, a motor rally, and a “spiritually enlightening tour of Gagarin sites” (http://urokiistorii.ru/1907).
The festivities drowned out real reflection, which would have drawn attention to the mythologization of Gagarin’s image, its ideological instrumentalization.
In their search for an ideal political leader in Russian history, authorities have turned to Pyotr Stolypin, one of the imperial state’s last prime ministers (1906-1911). Traditionally, Soviet historians emphasized Stolypin’s role in the harsh repression of the 1905 Revolution (the term “Stolypin’s neckties,” meaning scaffolds, became standard) and in carrying out a partially forcible program of relocation of peasants to Siberia (hence “Stolypin’s carriages”). Today Stolypin appears, first and foremost, as an example of an iron hand, a true believer in strong government authority, known for his statements before the Duma, in which he declared, “we do not need great upheavals, we need a great Russia.”
Both 2011 and 2012 feature “memorial dates” for Stolypin: the 100th anniversary of his brutal death and 150th anniversary of his birth (it is interesting that the LDPR was the first party to declare 2011 the “Year of Stolypin” – http://historypolitics.livejournal.com/28097.html).
The Stolypin campaign is gaining momentum toward summer, with then Prime Minister Putin’s announcement of the opening of a monument to the tsar’s minister in Moscow, which was meant to symbolize the continuation of a specific political tradition. Interestingly, Putin has suggested that Duma deputies donate money for the monument. Later, the details of Sberbank’s funds collection were officially published (http://urokiistorii.ru/2198), and toward the end of the year it grew obvious that, on account of insufficient funds, it would be impossible to open the monument on schedule (http://urokiistorii.ru/2548).
The Russian regions have also seen active use of Stolypin’s image, as in his native Saratov Region (http://www.urokiistorii.ru/2358), where high-level regional officials took part in staging a conference titled “Stolypin Readings. P.A. Stolypin: Traditions of Reform in Russia.” In Omsk, a local agrarian university took on Stolypin’s name (http://urokiistorii.ru/2161), and in Altai an academic department has been dedicated to the study of Stolypin’s legacy (particularly his reforms) (http://urokiistorii.ru/2460). Penza now boasts a new memorial plaque, and Krasnodar a new monument (http://www.urokiistorii.ru/2428, http://urokiistorii.ru/2338). In Altai, a location is being sought for a monument to Stolypin’s settlers, people who, as Altai Governor Alexander Karlin puts it, “transformed this harsh land through their self-sacrificing labor” (http://urokiistorii.ru/2220).
With rather characteristic initiative, representatives of the Vozvrashchenie [“Return” – trans.] Foundation offered a new solution to a lengthy debate over renaming the Voikovskaya metro station and the Voikovskiy District in Moscow (both of which are named for P. L. Voikov, a Bolshevik who took part in the execution of the tsar’s family: http://hrono.ru/biograf/bio_we/voykov_pl.php), suggesting that the station take the name “Stolypinskaya” (http://urokiistorii.ru/2185). While Pyotr Stolypin obviously has no connection of any kind with the city district or the metro station, the omnipresence of his image offers an opportunity to advocates of renaming to try this option, which might have worked during the peak of interest in the Prime Minister. No official steps, however, have yet been taken to rename the Voikovskaya metro station.
Memorial events honoring Stolypin, along with activities commemorating the 200th anniversary of the War of 1812, will prove to be some of the grandest of 2012, as then-President Medvedev suggested during summer 2011 in his proposal on “the year of Russian history” (http://urokiistorii.ru/2180).
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The year 1812 has become, to a greater degree even than Stolypin’s anniversary, 2012’s main theme. Preparations for the commemoration of Russia’s victory over Napoleon began as early as spring-fall 2011.
The celebrations will, above all, impact Moscow and the cities Napoleon’s army marched through en route to the capital. For instance, Smolensk has plans to renovate old monuments and build new ones, to issue a commemorative medal honoring the bicentennial of victory, to “renovate museums exhibitions,” and to carry out construction and repair projects that will enable the city to receive larger numbers of tourists (http://urokiistorii.ru/2096). The anniversary has attracted special attention thanks to the possibility of additional financing (during the summer, for example, it came to light that the celebration budget in Moscow was increased two and a half times, see: http://urokiistorii.ru/2169). When then-President Medvedev visited the city of Vyazma, local officials and historians informed him that, although their city had been a battleground during the Patriotic War of 1812, it was “not included in the celebration program.” Medvedev replied that he would take another close look at the program, while urging the historians to press local authorities for an answer, stating, “You must encourage your bosses to work on this, to spare money from even a modest budget to restore, for example, a memorial plaque. And, excuse me, sometimes you have to stimulate business to do this” (http://urokiistorii.ru/2406).
Borodinskiy bread has become a distinctive symbol of these events, now 200-years past
Of all the heroes of War 1812, General Yermalov, the “Conqueror of the Caucasus” and a key figure of Caucasian campaign of 1816-1827, proves the most complicated to memorialize. A monument to the general in the city of Mineralnye Vody was egged (http://urokiistorii.ru/2510), apparently with the support of a portion of the local Caucasian community. In 2008, before the monument had been opened, several city officials, in the heat of argument, publicly declared Yermolov a “tyrant,” while also stating with certainty that his monument would be eventually “demolished.”
Despite these attitudes, which had also emerged previously, the Russian Orthodox Church began as early as 2010 to discuss the possibility of canonizing the general (http://historypolitics.livejournal.com/13592.html).
The Russian Orthodox Church has also taken part in preparing to commemorate the bicentennial of the Patriotic War of 1812. Thus, the Yekaterinburg Diocese issued a DVD aimed at children in grades 5-7, featuring a quiz game on the war with Napoleon. The creators of the DVD, which is titled “All Russia Remembers the Day of Borodino,” describe it as having “less a religious than a historical and cultural inclination” (http://urokiistorii.ru/2431).
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The Russian Orthodox Church is one of the most visible and important “actors” in the field of historical politics.
The ROC, which frequently appeals to the pre-revolutionary past, is in reality a continuation of the Soviet-era Church, with both its history of struggle and its history of collaborationism. This likely explains the ROC’s ambiguous relationship to the past. On the one hand, the Church has assumed the role of guardian for the memory of the victims of Soviet repression (building monuments, consecrating churches on the sites of former prison camps (http://www.urokiistorii.ru/2356), and organizing special “penitential” religious processions (http://urokiistorii.ru/2302), etc.). On the other hand, supporting the state authorities, the Church develops the idea of state patriotism and traditional values in the spirit of the trinity, “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationalism” (hence the “Faith, Motherland, and Liberty” concept, adopted at the Board of Orthodox Public Unions meeting, see: http://urokiistorii.ru/1800).
History’s significance to the shaping of corporate identity in the Church is reflected in the popularity of the Orthodox Encyclopedia
It is characteristic that, during that the monitoring period, Patriarch Kirill has spoken publicly about his regret at the collapse of the Soviet Union, calling it the “ruin of historical Russia”
The Church’s position regarding religious evaluations of the events of Great Patriotic War proves polemical and not always cohesive. Religious remembrance of the victims of the Great Patriotic War aligns closely with another theme, that of the official memory of the War as a variety of civil cult. At the same time, some ROC representatives have criticized state ceremonies connected with the memory of the fallen. Thus, Sergei Chapnin, editor-in-chief of the Journal of the Moscow Patriarchy, who perceives this cult’s symbolism to be quasi-pagan, writes: the celebration of Victory Day is “constructed” like a religious rite <…>, the most “dangerous” elements of this religion are the image of an enemy, the “total glorification of the war,” and turning the war it into a cheap print (http://urokiistorii.ru/1713).
Another aspect is Church’s problem developing a perspective on the war that is religious and also consistent from the ethical point of view (http://historypolitics.livejournal.com/102273.html). Here, yet again, it is impossible to avoid internal contradictions: tragic deaths become a distinctive symbol of Victory’s greatness, the tragedy remains a tragedy, but the need to analyze the tragedy’s causes fades into the background, giving way to the high pathos of heroism and paeans to Victory. The Church's resurrection during the war years forms yet another layer of this story. This narrative, in which Stalin appears in the role of the repentant sinner, plays a part in preventing the Church from taking a stance that opposes the government's (http://historypolitics.livejournal.com/38001.html).
In discussing the central events of Russian history, the state authorities and the Church work together to paint a picture of the world that is in part Soviet and in part providential: victory in the war is the primary feat of the state and the people. The Russian Empire, the USSR, and the Russian Federation are embedded together in the overarching predetermined logic of development, wherein the Stolypin reforms, collectivization, repression, and Putin's “sovereign democracy” are all good in their own way.
Public and Private Initiatives, “Jamming” Historical Politics, “Counter-History”
Many public and private initiatives discover dishonesty and problematic places in the images of “institutional history.” Most of these do not set themselves the task of conflicting with the state’s view of the world, but the subject of repression, the histories of national minorities, and the images of local historical heroes all often contrast sharply with institutional historical politics. In describing this phenomenon, Marc calls in “counter-history.”
A significant number of these public and private initiatives are set in motion by groups and individuals whose actions the authorities interpret as “falsifications of history,” namely historical and human right organizations, as well as charity foundations (http://urokiistorii.ru/2136,http://www.urokiistorii.ru/2195), political opponents in the “non-parliamentary opposition” (http://www.urokiistorii.ru/2061, http://urokiistorii.ru/2272,http://urokiistorii.ru/2300), and sometimes even the scientific community, when it has “crossed the line” (http://www.urokiistorii.ru/2049). The layer of private initiatives is even more complicated and heterogeneous.
A separate category of examples illustrates society’s often remonstrative reactions to the various deeds of those who create historical politics. These reactions range from disorderly conduct (a veteran in Yekaterinburg trying to spit on a monument to Yeltsin http://historypolitics.livejournal.com/51107.html, the destruction or vandalism of monuments to Lenin in different cities http://urokiistorii.ru/2833) to conscious or semi-conscious acts of “jamming historical politics,” which try to distance the audience from an imposed historical image
The very idea of the existence of national history stands as the key disagreement between “institutional historical politics” and its adversaries. National history amounts to a historical epic, which is impossible if the past is to be examined. This difference is apparent when we look at examples of building memorials to victims of political repression. In Khakassia, for instance, local veterans have spoken out against the restoration of a monument to victims of repression, whom the veterans believe “hid Bandera’s followers” and delivered shots “in the back of the head.” These veterans also claim and that the victims’ rehabilitation was carried out “without considering the opinion of veteran soldiers” (http://urokiistorii.ru/2301). It is obvious that one narrative (about the Great Patriotic War and Victory) competes with another (the history of repression), with the “heroes” and “villains” switching places, causing violent arguments, but much more rarely leading reflection within society.
This is not to say that the theme of repression has been completely erased from official discourse, but the massive growth of information has proved sufficient to allow this subject to be almost completely eclipsed by other ongoing public issues. Judging by the news of the monitoring project, the subject of the memory of the repressed arises more often on the local level than the federal, and often at the urging of small social groups. Local societies of the repressed, veterans’ organizations, community groups, and local associations all put forth their own initiatives (http://www.urokiistorii.ru/2396, http://urokiistorii.ru/2323, http://urokiistorii.ru/2350, http://urokiistorii.ru/2170). The overall picture is complicated by the imposition of one date on another, “history's” calendar conflicts. Thus, Chechnya’s Day of Memory and Mourning, traditionally observed on February 23 (the beginning of Stalin’s deportations), at the same time when the rest of Russia (excluding Ingushetia, the homeland of yet another repressed minority) celebrates the Day of the Defenders of the Fatherland. In 2011, Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov shifted the date to May 10, the United Day of Memory and Mourning (in memory of the murder of this father, Akhmat Kadyrov). But this, once again, causes natural discomfort – the date is too close to May 9, the main Russia-wide historical-political celebration: Victory Day (http://urokiistorii.ru/1586).
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Movements opposing the state have offered society only a small handful of alternative historical heroes. This is primarily on account of fact that their selection is predetermined in large part by the figures’ importance in the history of Russian and Soviet state, and this history has been written and adopted by Russia’s citizens mainly from political and state positions. The twentieth century left behind few “political idealists” who are important to the population. The academic Andrei Sakharov – probably the most important of them – has become the central figure of the “I’m not Sakharov, but…” action, staged by the newly-formed group known as Sakharov’s Movement. Its organizers have prioritized the “question of responsibility” for an individual working to maintain his position in a non-free society. Individuals featured on a series of posters explained how they serve society in spite of the fact that they are “not Sakharov.” At that moment most had to acknowledge: “I’m not Sakharov, but neither are you.” (http://historypolitics.livejournal.com/86372.html). In honor of the 90th anniversary of the Nobel laureate’s birth, Channel One aired a film featuring one of Andrei Sakharov’s rare television appearances. In the film, My Father Andrei Sakharov, the central character was shown, according to human rights activist Sergei Kovalev, from two points of view: as a “bad father” and as a “hen-pecked husband” (http://urokiistorii.ru/2106). Sakharov’s public activities scarcely figure into the story, as the film intended to present Sakharov “from his family’s point of view.” In May, discussions arose on the subject of building a monument on Sakharov Avenue (http://www.urokiistorii.ru/1606), but no practical steps followed.
The Foreign Literature Library in Moscow is now home to a monument to another distinguished scientist, Dmitri Likhachev, a major figure in the development of national culture and a renowned public activist (http://urokiistorii.ru/1751). This event, however, passed almost unnoticed, as has the monument itself, since it stands alongside other monuments in the library atrium: to Gandhi, Wallenberg, and Pope John Paul II, among others.
To commemorate the 70th anniversary of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Memorial Society in cooperation with Yekaterinburg Pedagogical University, the Frassati Cultural Center (Italy), and the European Art, History and Culture Foundation organized an exhibition dedicated to writer Vassily Grossman and his book Life and Fate (http://urokiistorii.ru/2054). The organizers spoke about Grossman as a “great writer, one unfortunately not very well-known at home.” (In September 2011 a radio broadcast of his book became a bestseller on BBC4, and the sales of the book grew 8000% even before the first broadcasting, see: http://urokiistorii.ru/2373). Meanwhile in Russia, a state-run television channel may show in 2012 a 12-part adaptation of Life and Fate, directed by Sergei Ursulyak. In an interview about the movie, the director noted that the central issue of the book, a “conflict between a man and the state,” remains relevant in Russia (http://historypolitics.livejournal.com/51839.html).
One can hardly expect that this conflict to someday find complete resolution, but at the same time contemporary institutional state historical politics prefers to keep it off the agenda. The vacuum, however, is filled by an aestheticization of the missing elements – thus the NeverSleep travel agency offers tourists, as a part of its “Welcome to the USSR” tour of Moscow, the opportunity to “take part in a demonstration” (for summer 2011, “demonstration” is still an obvious anachronism), to “attend a party meeting,” and to “face repression.” The last piece appears the most ironic and post-modern, if we set the name of the agency alongside the usual NKVD practice of night arrests (http://urokiistorii.ru/2273).
At this point we would like to come back to Alexei Millers’ statement that historical politics can “[ruin the] room for dialogue in society on history problems“
Part of the population, quite naturally, rejects this state of affairs, and such a reaction in turn gives the authorities another means of emphasizing the importance of strengthening their program of historical enlightenment. Students in Yekaterinburg have posted a video online mocking their meeting with a veteran of the Great Patriotic War (on television channel Rossiia, Vesti protested the action, stating that “the derision a veteran of the Great Patriotic War should not go unpunished,” http://urokiistorii.ru/1662). On the eve of May 9, a compilation of statements about the holiday was published – these provocative statements, selected from social media outlets, reflected an amazing level of cynicism among the young people who wrote them (http://urokiistorii.ru/1605). The histrionic and unctuous image of the war and the annual unfolding of a pompous celebratory campaign, which many school children are compelled to participate in (through “educational” meetings with veterans, holiday concerts, etc.) give rise to what philologist Sergei Averintsev has called “the exploitation of generational conflicts”
More complex are the actions of those who react to the state’s historical politics by culture jamming
A comparison of two thematic and programmatic models of historical politics concludes with an example of two historical actions with different intentions, both of which took place in St. Petersburg in 2011.
A Special Case: Between Romanov and Brodsky
The most unpleasant peculiarity of any case of institutional historical politics is probably its obtrusiveness. Its ideas and its manifestations take over city streets and invade textbooks. The authorities strive to present these ideas as new moral standards, allegedly inherent in national identity. But this is a moral of double thinking – by defending state’s position, it is doomed to be inconsistent.
The images of Grigory Romanov, the chairman of the Leningrad Communist Party Regional Committee, and Joseph Brodsky, a poet and Nobel Prize winner, have collided within this controversial environment.
In May a memorial plaque was installed on a building where Grigory Romanov lived in St. Petersburg. Long before it was unveiled, when a decision of the city administration had been announced, several St. Petersburg cultural figures published a letter demanding the “immediate annulment of this dishonorable decision.” For them Romanov remained an example of a man who “strangled culture, science, art and freedom, hated the intelligentsia, and expelled artists, poets and painters form the city.” While Romanov was in power, Joseph Brodsky and Sergei Dovlatov left the city and the country. Romanov personally participated in persecution of Arkady Raikin, Georgy Tovstonogov, Sergei Yursky, Olga Berggoltz, Daniil Granin and Ales Adamovich. But the opinion of his former Party colleagues, who attended the opening of the memorial plaque, was different. They called Romanov “a man who left a good memory behind” (urokiistorii.ru/1625) and some of them spoke of his role in promoting Valentina Matvienko, who was at that moment serving as Governor of St. Petersburg.
In a week’s time, a group of activists organized public readings of Joseph Brodsky’s poems near the new plaque, timing this event to correspond with the anniversary of the poet’s birth. The organizers stressed that that was “not a rally or picketing,” but just a poetry reading – an answer to the “savage seriousness” of the speeches that former CPSU members dedicated to their former party boss (http://urokiistorii.ru/1841).
But this picture, which juxtaposes Romanov’s and Brodsky’s images, would be incomplete without another piece of May news from St. Petersburg: the great Russian poet Joseph Brodsky, along with Dmitri Likhachev, Victor Tsoy, Anna Akhmatova and many others, was given the “honor” of appearing as one of the “characters” featured on the posters United Russia used to celebrate City Day (http://www.urokiistorii.ru/1741). (Afterward United Russia was obliged to apologize for this initiative, in response to pressure from the descendents of the persons whose images the party used for its propaganda, see: http://www.newsru.com/cinema/25may2011/erpit.html).
Brodsky this appeared on one symbolic plaque of honor with his very oppressor, since the authorities believe it possible to associate themselves with both men. One can hardly find similarities between Brodsky and Romanov, aside from their virtual participation in United Russia’s program of historical politics.
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Alexander Daniel, a historian, in his speech at a press conference of the monitoring project at the Non/Fiction book festival, formulated the key question of the future of historical politics in Russia, asking, “Do we really need historical politics? And, if yes, would we prefer that it be possible to hear different points of view, or to see it be strong and consistent – but in a way that it is right for us?” This question inevitably leads to discussions of norms and anomalies in historical politics, private and public choices of particular values – and about the fact that the very practice of historical politics might exist outside of our idea of normality.
Russian historical politics, especially as practiced by the state, appear anachronistic against the background of a society that is developing and becoming more complex. The values it tries to impose – paternalistic and heavy – would be most certainly suitable for a traditional society, but prove increasingly alien in a post-industrial society. In the impossibility of their rebirth there is hope for inevitable and necessary change.
Prepared by Sergei Bondarenko
Translation: Elena Ivanova, Adrianne Jacobs
